Book Review: Global Environmental Problems and International Environmental Agreements: The Economics of International Institution Building, by Timothy Swanson and Sam Johnston by Ellis, Jaye
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 40, Number 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2002) Article 10
Book Review: Global Environmental Problems and
International Environmental Agreements: The
Economics of International Institution Building, by
Timothy Swanson and Sam Johnston
Jaye Ellis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Commons
Book Review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Ellis, Jaye. "Global Environmental Problems and International Environmental Agreements: The Economics of International Institution
Building, by Timothy Swanson and Sam Johnston." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 40.3/4 (2002) : 447-450.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol40/iss3/10
Book Reviews
freedom of expression means and who will be entitled to exercise it.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ECONOMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION BUILDING BY TIMOTHY
SWANSON AND SAM JOHNSTON (CHELTENHAM, U.K.:
EDWARD ELGAR, 1999)
BY JAYE ELLIS'
This book was initially conceived of as a resource for
representatives from developing countries negotiating multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAS). It focuses on the development of
international law and institutions for the management of global commons
resources, that is, resources that are not included in the realm of
competence of a single jurisdictional unit and that require coordination
among different units as well as the development of new structures and
processes for their proper management. The authors' objective is to
provide participants in negotiations with information explaining why
negotiations for the creation of conservation and management regimes for
commons resources break down or produce inefficient or unenforceable
agreements. Given this information, negotiators can avoid these pitfalls in
future negotiations.
The book is divided into three sections: the economics of global
environmental problems, developing international environmental law, and
principles of international environmental law. The first and third chapters
are primarily didactic, providing overviews of economic and legal
frameworks for analyzing global commons resources management. These
chapters will likely be too basic for either political scientists or international
lawyers, but members of each group can benefit greatly from the clear yet
critical overview of the analytical tools of the other group. As a result, the
book thus may promote much-needed communication between these
groups.
The authors analyze efficient resource use, relying primarily on
economic analysis, but taking a critical approach to the analytical tools
employed. The case supporting international co-operation for global
commons resource management is made through reference to the
limitations on state jurisdiction and to externalities that create disincentives
for individual states to pursue globally sustainable resource exploitation.
The authors consider global climate change, biodiversity conservation, and
I Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and School of Environment, McGill University.
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the trade-environment nexus in some detail to illustrate their arguments.
Because the authors rely primarily on an economic analysis of
global commons management, they focus on the difficulty of perverse
incentives to over-exploit commons resources and the need to counteract
these incentives in the design of international institutions, particularly by
including a mechanism to make side payments. The authors note that this
solution poses almost as many difficulties as it purports to solve, due to the
complexity of the resulting agreement, to the free rider problem, and to
weaknesses and difficulties in international law, including its horizontal
organization.
The authors argue that the underlying reason for the failure to
obtain agreement among countries on a particular strategy for managing
global commons resources lies in the distribution of the costs and benefits
of participation. Heterogeneity among states, which produces a diversity of
often incompatible interests with respect to a given environmental
resource, causes such distributional problems. Three underlying causes of
heterogeneity are focused on: different levels of development, different
investment choices, and physical locations. A fourth cause of heterogeneity,
differences in preferences, is also discussed, with reference to the decision
by some governments to permit imports of hazardous wastes and the siting
of environmentally harmful industries on their territories. The authors
ultimately conclude, however, that different preferences and tolerance
levels can be explained in terms of income level. In other words, they
constitute an aspect of different levels of development.
The authors argue that the causes of heterogeneity among states
are at least perceived to be objective. They conclude that, as long as these
causes are considered and an effort is made to understand the perspectives
of differently situated states, it is theoretically possible to structure a system
of incentives and side payments that will ensure an equitable distribution
of the costs and benefits flowing from the environmental regime.
Furthermore, this system of incentives should be objectively recognizable
as an equitable one.
At least two assumptions, one explicit and one implicit, are at work
here. The explicit assumption is that there is a common baseline underlying
the heterogeneity of interests in environmental resources. Once one
corrects for different levels of development, different investment histories,
and different physical locations, people will value an environmental
resource in the same way. In other words, heterogeneity is conditioned by
objective elements external to the subject, and environmental regimes can
correct for this heterogeneity by taking into account and adjusting for these
objective elements. The implicit assumption is that subjective elements,
such as preferences, different systems of valuation, as well as
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understandings of the world conditioned by different historical experiences,
do not affect states' perceptions of their interests in environmental
resources.
As a result of these assumptions, the authors arguably place too
much reliance on an evaluation of objectively determined costs and
benefits, and incentives and disincentives. This criticism may seem unfair,
as the authors did not intend to explain every cause of regime failure in
global environmental protection, but rather to guide potential participants
in negotiations concerning MEAS. However, the desire is that these
participants be aware of the range of reasons for regime failure; to put the
participants in a position to avoid these pitfalls, a broader inquiry would
have been very useful. The assumption that interests are exogenously
determined limits the types of solutions that one can seek in structuring
negotiations for MEAS as well as the regimes themselves.
Furthermore, the notion that all people would attribute the same
value to environmental resources if they were similarly situated seems quite
unrealistic. Our perceptions of the environment are certainly conditioned
by material factors, including our access to and dependence on
environmental resources. Other influences are ideational and depend on
a complex network of values, preferences, experiences, and understandings.
In order to design an effective regime, it is vital both to consider the
distribution of costs and benefits and to seek to render this distribution as
equitable as possible. However, an appreciation of costs and benefits as
well as an appreciation of the extent to which the final product is equitable
depend on subjective as well as objective elements. For example, good
regime design depends as much on ensuring the confidence of relevant
actors in the process and the outcome as on striking the right balance
between costs and benefits.
The book is rich in examples and discusses a wide array of resource
management problems in international society. However, it would have
been helpful to learn more about the criteria used to select the case studies
so that it would be easier to assess the extent to which lessons drawn from
the examples are applicable to other contexts. One of the biggest
weaknesses of these case studies is that the research is, at times, quite out
of date, causing the authors to take an unnecessarily pessimistic view of
outcomes in international environmental law.2 Finally, given the book's
2 For example, the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 10 December 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [Convention] is described as not having entered into force and as not having been signed
by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In fact, the former
two countries have acceded to the Convention, which entered into force in 1994. In addition, the
discussion of the quota management system for ivory from African elephants under the Convention
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emphasis on the importance of international institutions for enforcement
and monitoring, it would have been instructive to see some reflection on
regimes that are often held up as examples in these respects, such as the
regime for the protection of the ozone layer.
The book's strength lies in the two didactic chapters, which increase
the accessibility of a range of analytical tools to scholars interested in
conservation and management of global commons resources. As such, the
book will likely promote communication among people trained in different
disciplines, and prepare the ground for much-needed interdisciplinary and
trans-disciplinary work in the area.
for International Trade in Endangered Species, 3 March 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (CITES) does not refer
to developments subsequent to the 1989 Conference of the Parties. Important developments have
taken place within CITES with respect to the African elephant and the ivory trade since then.
